Fully Secure Functional Encryption Without Obfuscation

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Example: Spam Filter



Solution 0: Give cloud **sk** ⇒ cloud learns entire message ✗

Solution 1: Use FHE ⇒ cloud only learns **Enc(f(m))** ✗

Solution 2: Functional encryption: cloud learns **f(m)**, nothing else ✓

Functional Encryption: Semantics [BSW'11]

Gen(): Output keys **(msk, pk)**

Enc(pk, m): Output ciphertext **c**

KeyGen(msk, f): Output decryption key $\mathbf{sk_f}$

Dec($\mathbf{sk_f}$, c): Output **f(m)**

Functional Encryption: Security [BSW'10,O'N'10]

Unbounded full adaptive game-based security:



Before Obfuscation

Tons of work on special cases: IBE, ABE, PE…

[SW'05, BSW'10,O'N'10]: Definitions

[BW'07,KSW'08,AFV'11,SSW'09]: Simple functions

[SS10,GVW'12,GKPVZ'12]: Bounded number of secret keys

[AGVW'12]: Impossibility of unbounded simulation-based def

No unbounded constructions until…

After Obfuscation: First Unbounded Constructions



Why Obfuscation Seems Inherent



Why Obfuscation Seems Inherent

Decryption must hide intermediate values



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

Common ways to hide intermediate values hide circuit too. E.g.

- garbled circuits
- branching progs
- obfuscation

f is now hidden

Note: [BCP'13] does **not** have function hiding

Function Hiding ⇒ IO

iO(C):

(msk,pk) ← Gen()
sk ← KeyGen(msk,C)
Output **(pk,sk)**

Eval((pk,sk), x):

e = Enc(pk,x)
y = Dec(sk,e)

sk hides **C** → indistinguishability obfuscation

Takeaway: FE with function hiding implies iO

Question 1:

Can we build FE without iO?

Why avoid Obfuscation?

iO = exponentially many assumptions

- One per pair of circuits

Assumption(C_0,C_1):

$$iO(C_0) \approx iO(C_1)$$

Seems inherent:



Reduction can only work for equiv C_0, C_1

⇒ must somehow decide equivalence (NP-hard)

What about GLSW?

[GLSW'14]: iO from Multilinear Subgroup Elimination (MSE):



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

- Need to assume MSE **really** hard (complexity leveraging)

Note: Adaptive vs selective FE meaningless in this setting



Question 2:

Can we build (adaptive) FE from fixed assumptions w/o complexity leveraging?

Our answer to questions 1 & 2:

YES!

Generalization: Slotted Functional Encryption



Slotted Functional Encryption

Private (slotted) encryption: encrypt in all slots



Slotted Functional Encryption

Public (unslotted) encryption: encrypt in slot 0



Slotted Functional Encryption

Slotted keygen: secret keys in all slots



Slotted Functional Encryption

Unslotted keygen: secret keys in slot 0

- Derived from slotted alg



Slotted Functional Encryption

Decryption: decrypt all active slots, output result if agree



Slotted FE to (Unslotted) FE

Throw away slotted algorithms

Enc(msk, (m_0, m_1, m_2, …))

Enc(pk, m)

KeyGen(msk, (f_0, f_1, f_2, …)

KeyGen(msk, f)

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Security of Slotted Functional Encryption

Ideal: can't learn anything except through decryption



Too strong: implies function hiding in unslotted scheme

Security of Slotted Functional Encryption

Strategy: define desired property:

- Strong ciphertext indistinguishability

Derive from other simpler properties:

- Slot Duplication
- Slot symmetry
- Single use hiding
- Ciphertext moving
- Weak key moving
- Strong key moving
- New slot
- Weak ciphertext indistinguishability

Security of Slotted Functional Encryption

Strong Ciphertext Indistinguishability: change ciphertext slot (possibly in slot **0**) as long as decryption unaffected



$m_0 = -1 \rightarrow m_0 = 1$ does not affect decryption

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

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Security of Slotted Functional Encryption

Slot Duplication: Copy any slot (inc. slot **0**) into unused slot (except slot **0**) (don't have to copy everything)



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

Security of Slotted Functional Encryption

New Slot: In unused slot (except slot **0**), put any ciphertext val



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

Security of Slotted Functional Encryption

Slot Symmetry: Swap two slots (except slot **0**)



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

Security of Slotted Functional Encryption

Strong Key Moving: Move any secret key slot into inactive slot (neither can be slot **0**) as long as decryption unaffected



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

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

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

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Single Use Hiding: Change ctxt and 1 sk in otherwise unused slot (except slot **0**) as long as decryption unaffected



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

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

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

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Weak Ciphertext Indistinguishability: change ciphertext slot (except slot **0**) as long as decryption unaffected



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

Reductions!



Sanity Check: Slot 0 in secret keys cannot change ⇒ no function hiding

Example Reduction: Strong Sk Moving

Goal: move f_1 to slot **3**



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

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

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

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

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

Single Use Hiding

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

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

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

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

Slot Duplication

Example Reduction: Strong Sk Moving

Goal: move $\mathbf{f_1}$ to slot **3**



Slot Duplication

Example Reduction: Strong Sk Moving

Goal: move f_1 to slot **3**



Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Strong Sk Moving

Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Strong Sk Moving

Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Strong Sk Moving

Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Strong Sk Moving

Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Strong Sk Moving

Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Strong Sk Moving

Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Slot Symmetry

Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Slot Symmetry

Example Reduction: Weak Ctxt Indist

Goal: change m_2 to -1



Instantiating Slotted FE

We give construction for NC^1 circuits from composite-order graded encodings

- Slot Symmetry/Single-use Hiding: Information theoretic
- Slot Duplication/Ctxt Moving/Sk Moving: simple assumptions

Construction requires new **extension** procedure on encodings

- bind ctxt (or sk) components together (no “mixing and matching”)
- Do not need to modify underlying encodings

Theorem: Relatively simple assumptions on mmaps
⇒ (adaptively) secure FE for NC^1

But I promised FE for all circuits…

Achieving FE for All Circuits



Randomized FE for NC^1

Basic idea: ctxt contains PRF key which generates randomness

$Enc_R(mpk, m)$: $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$

$c \leftarrow Enc(mpk, (m,k))$

Output c

Define: $g[f,s](m,k) := f(m ; PRF(k,s))$

$KeyGen_R(msk, f)$: $s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$

$sk_f \leftarrow KeyGen(msk, g[f,s])$

Output sk_f

Actual scheme more complicated

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Slot Duplication

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Slot Duplication

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Ciphertext Moving

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Ciphertext Moving

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



"Super Strong Secret Key Moving"

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



"Super Strong Secret Key Moving"

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



"Super Strong Secret Key Moving"

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



"Super Strong Secret Key Moving"

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



"Super Strong Secret Key Moving"

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



"Super Strong Secret Key Moving"

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Ciphertext Moving

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Slot Duplication

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Slot Duplication

Randomized FE for NC^1

Proof idea:



Achieving "Super Strong Secret Key Moving"

Outputs different, even though indistinguishable

⇒ strong secret key moving not enough

More involved proof:

- Puncture **k** at **s**
- Hardcode **f(m_0, PRF(k, s))**
  - In ciphertext if secret key before ciphertext. Use ctxt indist.
  - In secret key if secret key after ciphertext. Use single-use hiding+
- Replace with **f(m_1, PRF(k, s))**
  - Using PRF security and sample indistinguishability
- Move secret key
- Un-puncture

FE for all Circuits

Basic idea: Output randomized encoding rather than actual val

$\mathbf{Enc_C(mpk, m):}$ $\quad \mathbf{c \leftarrow Enc_R(mpk, m)}$

Output $\mathbf{c}$

$\mathbf{KeyGen_C(msk, f):}$ $\quad \mathbf{f'(m; r) := Encode_f(m ; r)}$

$\mathbf{sk_f \leftarrow KeyGen_R(msk, f')}$

Output $\mathbf{sk_f}$

$\mathbf{Dec_C(sk_f, c):}$ $\quad \mathbf{e \leftarrow Dec_R(sk_f, c)}$

$\mathbf{o \leftarrow Decode(e)}$

Output $\mathbf{o}$

Conclusion and Open Problems

Simple assumptions → Slotted FE → Fully-secure unbounded FE

- iO/complexity leveraging/function hiding **not** inherent to FE

New tools on graded encodings

Open Problems:

- Other apps for slotted FE?
- Simplify: remove punctured PRFs / randomized encodings?
- Other ***iO*** apps → simple assumptions
  - Deniable encryption
  - Multiparty NIKE w/o trusted setup